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April 2012: In Dambulla, a bustling market town built around a crossroads 
on the northern cusp of Sri Lanka’s central province, a mosque was 
attacked by a procession of protestors led by the chief priest of the nearby 
Buddhist temple. Ostensibly the protest was against the presence of the 
mosque on the grounds that it had been built in an exclusively Buddhist 
‘sacred area’. Beginning with an empirical account of the attack on the 
Dambulla mosque this paper argues that the preservation of what is 
deemed to be ‘sacred’ in Sri Lanka provides an effective idiom through 
which certain religious figures can intelligibly articulate political claims 
whilst maintaining critical distance from the dirty world of ‘Politics’. 
Corollary to this, and drawing on two years of ethnographic fieldwork in 
Dambulla, the paper explores the various different meanings of politics 
locally: highlighting the interplay of everyday politicking and high-profile 
political performance.   
 
Introduction  
 
The attack on the Dambulla mosque in April 2012 required the intervention of the 
army to quell and consequently gained - for a short period of time - national and even 
international media coverage. The event provided a headline-grabbing example of 
what seems to be a recent surge of ethno-religious nationalism in Sri Lanka. The 
Dambulla mosque attack has become emblematic of a phenomenon in post-war Sri 
Lanka, in which attacks on religious sites have come to the forefront of public 
attention (CPA 2013). The start of 2013 has seen an increase in the public propagation 
of anti-Muslim sentiment from Buddhists in Sri Lanka in a way that was not seen 
throughout the war. Rallies and marches have been organised to intimidate Muslim 
business owners, anti-Muslim pamphlets have been widely distributed and social 
media has also been used to mobilise anti-Muslim movements.1  
 
This paper zooms in from the national scene, where public commentary has been 
largely dominated by journalists, and presents an analysis of the attack on the 
Dambulla mosque drawing from the author’s experience at the protest and from living 
in the town for over a year prior to the event. The first half of the paper is dedicated to 
providing a detailed account of what happened on the day the Dambulla mosque was 
attacked and how things played out in the days that followed. The second half will 
focus on the protagonist of the protest, the chief priest of the local Buddhist temple.  
                                                          
 Laheslop@gmail.com 
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At a theoretical level, the paper examines the local understanding of ‘politics’ and 
‘politicking’ in Dambulla and provides new ethnographic insights into the complex 
relationship between religion and politics in Sri Lanka. 
 
Although the mosque sits at the centre of the ethnographic action, this paper is not 
positioned within existing scholarship on Muslim identity formation (see, Haniffa 
2008; Thiranagama 2012), or a broader history of Muslim persecution in Sri Lanka 
(see, Samaraweera 1979; Roberts 1981; Ismail 1985; Haniffa 2007), or even Muslim 
politics and minority rights in Sri Lanka (Haniffa 2009, 2013). Instead, the paper sits 
between and builds upon two different canons in the anthropology of Sri Lanka: that 
of political-Buddhism (Gombrich & Obeysekere 1988, Kemper 1991, Tambiah 1992, 
Scott 1994 Seneviratne 1999, and Abeysekera 2002) and the anthropology of politics 
and nationalism (Tennekoon 1988, 1990;Spencer 1990, 2007; Brow 1996; 
Gunawardana 1990; Woost 1990, 1993; De Alwis 1996, 1998; Jaganethan & Ismail 
2009; Amarasuriya 2010).2 Recent contributions to understanding further the 
relationship between politics and religion in Sri Lanka have been made from the field 
of Political Geography (Goodhand, Klem, Korf 2009, Klem 2011, Johnson 2012). 
These explore the capacity of religious institutions and figures to operate in political 
arenas and will also be discussed within. For now though, let us return to April 22nd 
2012.   
 
Account of Events 
 
Purely by chance, Chula and I drank tea in a stall by the junction near the entrance to 
the Dambulla Golden Temple on the day of the protest. From where we sat we could 
see the fifty-foot high Golden Buddha statue that had been built under the auspices of 
the temple’s chief priest (māha nāyaka), the Venerable Inamaluwe Sri Sumangala 
Thero (henceforth Sumangala). The enormous golden structure sits at the bottom of 
the Dambulla rock and dominates the entrance to the Dambulla Cave Temple. The 
Cave Temple at the top of the rock and the Golden Temple at the bottom are two 
separate institutions but resided over by the same chief priest – Sumangala.3 Also 
situated at the bottom of the rock is Sumangala’s media business, ‘The Rangiri 
Dambulu Media Network’, which runs a newspaper, a radio station, and soon a 
television station.4  
 
A government bus carrying soldiers parked on the road outside the tea stall; perhaps 
alerted by the local minister after a ‘fire-bomb’ had been thrown at the mosque the 
night before the protest. The soldiers started to position themselves around the 
junction and the entrance to the mosque, which had been decorated in multi-coloured 
Buddhist flags. Beneath the multi-coloured flags that hung limply in the warm 
morning air, gathered men in crisp white shirts. The white shirt is considered proper 
attire both for visiting a Buddhist temple and holding political office in Sri Lanka. In 
much the same way, Dipesh Chakrabarty writing on clothing the ‘political man’ in 
India notes that the white Khadi, popularized by Gandi in the 1920s, represents ‘the 
Hindu idea of purity (without blemish, pollution)’ (Chakrabarty 2001:27), thus 
collapsing a political message of renouncing wealth, putting the nation first and being 
pure of corruption, with Hindu religious piety. In the tea stall by the temple, political 
righteousness and religious virtue were threaded together in the white shirts worn by 
the protestors; forming a visual display of Clifford Geertz’ assertion that ‘The gravity 
of high politics and the solemnity of high worship’ are analogous (Geertz, 1983:124). 
 3 
Towards the temple the police were stationing themselves at intervals along the 
roadside where groups of people were meeting before making their way up to the 
temple for the rally.  
 
At the temple Sumangala told a large crowd that Muslim terrorists (Mussal Waroo 
Trusthawāthi) are wiping out the Buddhist heritage in the whole of Asia.5 The crowd, 
which comprised of people from Dambulla and beyond (mainly farmers but also some 
businessmen form the town) had been gathered to protest the presence of a mosque 
that had been ‘illegally’ developed in an apparently exclusively Buddhist ‘sacred 
area’ referred to as, Pūja Bhūmiya. When Sumangala finished his caustic diatribe 
against Muslims in Dambulla, Sri Lanka, Asia, and the world, he led the march to the 
mosque. The tone set by Sumangala in his opening address was continued by the 
protestors as they proceeded down the road chanting, “may Sinhala, apigay ratay” – 
this is the country of us Sinhala people.6  
 
Dambulla is a trading hub for vegetables with a population of approximately 70,000 
people. Muslims account for less than ten percent of the population in Dambulla, 
which is, by a large majority, predominantly Sinhala-Buddhist. Most Muslims 
working in Dambulla commute in to do so from surrounding towns like Naula, Matale 
and Galewela, and many run lucrative stalls in the wholesale vegetable market. The 
mosque itself is situated roughly three hundred meters away from the Buddhist 
temple, down the main road towards the town. It is about fifteen meters in length and 
in height does not protrude above the dilapidated houses that shield it from the main 
road. It has no minarets or domes, or other typical features of Islamic architecture. 
There are a few taps outside, one tank for ablutions before worship and a main prayer 
room. The mosque was built on private land in 1962 and later extended in 1997.7 
Relocating the mosque had been under discussion with the Mosque Committee and 
the local government authority - relatively amicably I was told - for some time before 
the protest took place. Despite its longevity in Dambulla it has the appearance of a 
temporary structure, constructed as it is, out of green corrugated sheet metal. The 
main entrance is down a narrow alleyway from the main road, where it is blocked off 
from the street behind a metal door.  
 
It was at this metal door that connects the mosque to the main road down which the 
procession arrived, that the crowds were forced to stop. The bottleneck in the 
procession meant that the road quickly filled with people who chanted and cheered as 
the door to the mosque was being smashed. Eventually, after a fairly lackluster 
attempt by the police to stop protesters, the door was forced open and the soldiers 
who were in position behind the door stemmed the flow of people getting through. 
The soldiers negotiated with the monks, letting several of them in but denying other 
protesters entry. Whilst civilian protestors were stopped at the main entrance to the 
mosque, another side entrance was soon discovered through a garden that had open 
access from the road. The crowd cheered and piled in but were soon halted by the 
army, at which point they began to throw rocks towards the mosque before realizing 
they might hit one of the monks who were closer to it. The protest itself was actually 
very well managed once the army took control. The monks were able to inspect the 
mosque and the soldiers kept away those who might have damaged it; meanwhile, the 
media were able to capture most of what unfolded inside and outside. Ironically, the 
actual location of the mosque, which had caused so much uproar, was little known by 
those protestors seemingly most upset by it.  Due to the fact that only certain people 
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could make it through the army cordon around the mosque, many men and women 
gathered on the road outside. 
 
 
Women from the temple dressed immaculately in white sat modestly on the road, 
embodying the calm presence of the ‘Moral Mother’ of Sinhalese folk-law, Vihara 
Maha Devi, who’s ‘call to arms is one of patriotism and not violence’ (De Alwis 
1998:260). Next to the composed women in white lay a man exhausted and emotional 
with over-excitement. The army had not let him follow the monks through to the 
mosque and he had worn his voice down to a thin rasp, declaring to those on the road 
how his blood ran for the country. In contrast to the excitement that had built up 
outside the army cordon around the mosque where chanting, crying, rock throwing, 
and lying on the road ensued; scenes closer to the mosque were remarkably controlled 
and calm. I watched as my friends and neighbours made various attempts to get past 
the army line to destroy the mosque.  
 
Sensing the situation was getting increasingly heated, and having received veiled 
threats myself, I decided it would be smart to find a friend. I spotted Anil and decided 
he would be a decent protestor to align myself with as he too was trying to keep a 
fairly low profile. When I arrived in Dambulla, Anil was competing for a place on the 
Urban Council (Nagara Sabha), which he successfully obtained. He was the only 
government figure at the protest until the Pradeshiya Lekum (Divisional Secretary) 
turned up later to speak to some of the members of the Mosque Committee.8 On the 
day of the protest the government, and in particular the local minister, was being held 
responsible for not protecting Buddhism, the Sinhala race, or the Sinhala nation. 
Sumangala claimed that the local minister was directly responsible for the 
construction of this mosque and the affluence of Muslims in Dambulla. It is also 
strongly believed that Muslim votes in Dambulla go to the current minister. As a 
politician, Anil was placed very much as part of the problem at the protest. Together 
Anil and I shifted around the outskirts of the protest when it got heated, but eventually 
I decided upon a change of vantage point completely and in doing so witnessed a 
different scene play out.        
 
Pādeniya interlude: the showdown at the kovil 
 
Opposite the mosque, just across the main road that runs from the Dambulla temple to 
the town is a small cluster of houses - much like a hamlet - collectively referred to as 
Pādeniya. Here, a slightly different dimension to the protest began to unfold. 
Sumangala, with a contingent of followers including several police officers, broke 
away from the main group at the front of the mosque and made his way to the Hindu 
temple (referred to henceforth as a kovil - the Tamil word for temple) in the centre of 
Pādeniya. A young woman approached Sumangala and tried to explain that there have 
been people living in this hamlet for decades, that it was the temple that had allowed 
them to stay on the land initially, and that the people of Pādeniya worship at and give 
Pujawa (act of worship or offering, referred to henceforth as puja) to the Dambulla 
temple. Sumangala was not interested in her claims and despite her humble and 
diplomatic approach - referring to the monk respectfully and intimately as apē 
hamaduru (our monk) - she was offensively dismissed.910 Sumangala demanded the 
removal of the kovil and of all the houses from around the base of the temple before 
departing. 
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As he was leaving Pādeniya with his entourage a young man standing on the edge of 
the kovil shouted antagonistically at the group, expressing his displeasure with what 
had transpired. This parting shot met with quick response from a man in Sumangala’s 
company. The two men then began to shout at one another aggressively and very 
quickly the issue developed from one concerning a mosque and a kovil on exclusively 
Buddhist ‘sacred ground’ and found - sadly familiar - expression in the discourse of 
ethnic identity. The man with Sumangala called the villager defending the kovil a 
Tamil in a derogatory manner. The man from Pādeniya, who was standing on the 
edge of the kovil, clearly angry and distressed, passionately and definitively screamed 
his response, “mama Sinhala!” – I am Sinhala! This short scene requires some further 
context.     
 
Pādeniya is somewhat hidden from sight behind a row of fairly run down shops 
clustered together along the main road from the temple to the town selling pots, pans 
and plastic chairs. It was in the shaded crevices of these shops that the Pādeniya 
residents, who are mostly Hindu Tamils, stood and watched the protest unfold outside 
the mosque before Sumangala’s project of purifying the ‘sacred area’ around the 
Dambulla temple turned its attention to their own kovil. Most of the marriages in 
Pādeniya are between Tamil men from Pādeniya and Tamil women from Matale but 
there are several mixed marriages between Sinhalese men and Tamil women. 
Although there were only four that I was aware of, I was repeatedly told that such 
mixed marriages were common here. As a result of this frequent occurrence of 
Sinhala-Tamil mixed marriages, many of the younger generation in Pādeniya, such as 
the man confronting Sumangala from the edge of the kovil, refer to themselves as 
Sinhalese. Additionally, many of the younger generation in Pādeniya don’t actually 
speak Tamil. Although some claimed to, they were often promptly rebuked (in 
Sinhala) by their elders and told not to tell lies.  
 
Pādeniya is ostensibly a ‘Tamil village’. With the exception of several mixed Sinhala-
Tamil marriages and the children begot from these marriages, all other inhabitants are 
Tamil, and there is a kovil with a shrine to Murugan (the Hindu god of war) in the 
centre of the village. There is an impressive kovil festival that takes place over three 
days every August, which sends a large procession of Pādeniya residents suspended 
from hooks buried in their skin through the centre of Dambulla town in a practice 
called thuukkukkaavadi (in Tamil) associated with the Hindu god Murugan.11 
However, some of the inhabitants of this seemingly Tamil village are Sinhalese 
Buddhists with a Tamil mother. Others are Tamil but attended the Buddhist Temple 
Montessori as children and later studied at the Sinhala medium government school; 
they do not speak Tamil as their first language, they give puja at the Buddhist temple 
and, although they do celebrate Tamil festivals, they participate in the Dambulla 
Perahera, organised by the Buddhist Temple.12 Although only a fragment of a much 
more complex picture, it is in this social mélange that a man who identifies himself as 
a Sinhalese Buddhist defended a kovil in a Tamil village in front of a powerful 
Buddhist priest.    
 
Back over the road  
 
Inside the mosque during the protest were prominent members of the Mosque 
Committee, including a member of the Provincial Council, and several wealthy 
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traders from the Dambulla vegetable market. Whilst the Mosque Committee were 
ushered out of one side of the building, the protestors gathered on the other, charging 
at the army, throwing rocks at the mosque and performing the Buddhist chant, Sādu-
Sādu-Sādu.13 The army kept the crowds away from the mosque itself whilst the 
District Inspector General (D.I.G) and Sumangala ceremoniously sealed the door to 
the mosque closed. The protest had been a success and Sumangala said as much in his 
closing address to the crowd after they followed him back up the road to the 
Dambulla temple. The protest ended with the declaration that there would be a 
meeting in three days time between the government and the Mosque Committee in 
which they must organise the relocation of the mosque. In the mean time, Sumangala 
told the crowd to boycott Muslim shops.   
 
The interested parties in Dambulla, the Dambulla Mosque Committee, Sumangala and 
the temple, and the local government had done what they could for the time being. 
The Mosque Committee had gone through their various political connections; from 
Provincial Councillors to Cabinet Ministers, in order to leverage influence on higher 
planes within the government. Muslim ministers did not want to speak to anyone 
other than the President himself.14 Sumangala and the divisional-level state 
bureaucracy could also only wait for the response of the national government. Whilst 
waiting for news from the highest reaches of government, which did not come quickly 
as the President was away on a tour of South Korea, what occurred in Dambulla was a 
state of political paralysis. Whereby, the established institutional hierarchies of power 
in Sri Lanka’s political architecture, to which the Mosque Committee and the local 
government would ordinarily reach out to, lacked the capacity to respond coherently 
to appeals.  
 
In the President’s absence the government response was a confused one, the Prime 
Minister demanded the mosque be removed whilst the local minister (who is also the 
Lands Minister) publicly condemned the monk and supported the Mosque Committee. 
Minister A.H.M Fowzie ceremoniously reopened the door to the Dambulla mosque 
previously sealed by Sumangala and the D.I.G, and the National Physical Planning 
Department of the Ministry of Urban Development and Sacred Area Development, 
sent two representatives to tell the Pādeniya residents that their houses were to be 
flattened to make way for the proposed Dambulla temple car park.15 Meanwhile, the 
Urban Development Authority issued letters to a number of shops and households in 
the area claiming that they had to move as their property was on ‘sacred ground’ – a 
claim to land later shown to have no provision in the existing legal framework of Sri 
Lanka (CPA 2012:07). Local government and the Mosque committee could not act 
until further news from the national government, but similarly, government ministers 
could not establish a political solution until the President arrived. Thus politicians, 
local government authorities, and ministerial departments could only perform gestures 
of managing the affair until the President returned. For the Muslims who attend the 
Dambulla mosque, the residents of Pādeniya, and Sumangala’s crowd, everyday 
business resumed.     
 
Whilst Dambulla drew breath in paralysis, people in other parts of the country 
protested the closure of the mosque, which had gained a large degree of media 
attention over the previous week. Two days after the meeting at the Dambulla 
Provincial Council offices, there were ‘hartals’ (enforced closure of shops and 
businesses in protest) in the heavily Muslim-populated areas in the East of the 
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country.16 The central Colombo mosque also held a rally in support of the Dambulla 
mosque. The Colombo Telegraph talked of a ‘prevailing crisis’ and there was a 
military presence in Ampara as Muslims set fire to tyres in the road in protest.17 
Mirroring the events on the day, in which scenes from inside the mosque were calm 
and those on the periphery chaotic, Dambulla was now composed whilst the outside 
world appeared to be descending into ‘crisis’.    
 
When a national-level discourse developed around the Dambulla mosque incident, it 
transformed the local management of the issue itself. A Muslim vegetable trader made 
this clear to me when he told me that the relocation of the mosque had previously 
been under discussion with the Divisional Secretary before Sumangala carried out the 
protest. However, the trader claimed, because of the way the protest had been 
conducted, the Muslims will never move the mosque now. The propensity for a public 
event, such as a protest or riot, to transcend the local context in which it was 
conceived and take on new kinds of meaning, is a process that has been well 
documented in South Asia (Brass 1997; Das 1995, 1996; Tambiah 1996). In the 
national press, the mosque protest had been sewn into a historicity of Muslim 
persecution and Sinhala chauvinism, and had come to be narrated by groups of actors 
operating within different political spheres. Following Sumangala’s protest, relocating 
the mosque became a very different issue extracted from its local management, 
embroiled in an on-going national-level conversation concerning minority politics, 
and made emblematic of a broader swathe of attacks on religious sites in Sri Lanka 
since the end of the war in 2009 (CPA 2013). Despite the so called ‘prevailing crisis’ 
of 2012 exemplified by the protest at the Dambulla mosque, both the mosque and the 
kovil are still standing and still very much in use today (June 2013). The kovil is 
attended by the residents of Pādeniya and by several people in Dambulla who had 
been present at the protest against the mosque. The houses around the kovil are also 
still standing. 
 
Sacred Politics  
 
The attack on the Dambulla mosque and the Pādeniya kovil was couched in terms of 
protecting a ‘sacred area’. The term ‘sacred area’ gained credence at the turn of the 
twentieth century, when revivalist and social reformer Walisinghe Harischandra 
succeeded in annexing substantial amounts of land in Anurādhapura, a larger city to 
the north of Dambulla, to be exclusively preserved as Buddhist ‘sacred’ sites 
(Kemper, 1991: 142). Constructing the ‘sacred area’ in Anurādhapura involved 
removing churches, kovils, and administrative buildings.18 Harischandra’s success in 
Anurādhapura imposed a ‘distinctive language of argument on religious affairs’ (ibid: 
143), in which demarcating a ‘sacred area’ (Pūja Bhūmiya) gained gravitas, not only 
as a technique of ethno-religious purification - the separation of Sinhala-Buddhist 
(sacred) sites from the mundane world of government offices and the removal of all 
other religious buildings and non-Buddhists - but importantly, as a performance of 
religious responsibility that is inseparable from the domain of ‘the political’ in Sri 
Lanka. The act of demarcating and protecting ‘sacred areas’ is thus an idiom through 
which political claims can be articulated intelligibly and effectively in Sri Lanka. 
 
The act of protecting or renovating a sacred area in pre-colonial Lanka was celebrated 
in the Mahāvamsa – the so called ‘ancient chronicles’ of Sri Lanka - as an act first 
and foremost of religious responsibility. In the twentieth century, the protection of 
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sacred sites found traction in the rhetoric of politicians and Buddhist activists (ibid: 
23). The best example of this can be seen in state-led development projects, such as 
the Mahaveli Irrigation Project of the 1960s and later the ‘Accelerated’ Mahaveli 
scheme of 1978. Politicians framed these national development projects as the 
reincarnation of an ancient, indigenous, Sinhalese-Buddhist national culture, 
moreover, reclaiming a Sinhala-Buddhist space, the Rajarata - the northern kingdom 
(Tennekoon, 1988, 1990; Woost, 1990, 1993, 1997). According to Abeysekera (2002: 
187), Dambulla became developed as a ‘sacred’ site explicitly as a political project in 
1979 when the United National Party (UNP) government designated it as such during 
an archaeological excavation project undertaken to raise Dambulla’s profile as a 
centre of pilgrimage.  
 
Preserving a ‘sacred area’ in Sri Lanka is at once performing a religious responsibility 
and inescapably at the same time, the pursuit of a Buddhist-political project. 
Similarly, an attack on Tamils and Muslims - as occurred in Pādeniya - is inescapably 
political. Interethnic relations, as Paul Brass asserts, ‘have become such a pervasive 
concern in contemporary societies that the interpretation of virtually any act of 
violence between persons identified as belonging to different ethnic groups itself 
becomes a political act’ (Brass, 1997: 04). However, when Sumangala rallied the 
protesters together and ordered the removal of the mosque and the kovil on the 
grounds that they were built in an exclusively Buddhist ‘sacred area’, he claimed 
simply to be fulfilling a religious responsibility.  
 
By the middle of the twentieth century Sri Lankan politicians proved acutely aware of 
the importance of infusing political projects of national infrastructure development 
with the development of Sinhala culture and Buddhism in Sri Lanka (Tennekoon 
1988, 1990; Woost 1990, 1993, 1997; Van der Horst 1995). Conversely, Sumangala 
understands the importance of renouncing anything explicitly ‘political’ in his 
projects which he places firmly in the realm of religious responsibility and the 
‘spiritual development’ of the country, this is a responsibility exclusively reserved for 
the monastic community (Sangha) in Sri Lanka (Abeysekera 2002). As he explained 
it to me:  
 
‘According to my opinion, development means physical and 
spiritual. Accordingly, development of Dambulla should be 
taken up. Physical development is looked after by the 
government and spiritual development is under the temple. But 
Dambulla temple is always to the welfare of both the above. 
Presently, both these could not be achieved due to political 
interference’ (interview with Sumangala June 2012). 
 
Sumangala expresses a clear distinction between: the mundane obligation of physical 
development which is undertaken by the government; the spiritual development of 
Dambulla which is undertaken by the temple; and ‘political interference’. By 
‘physical development’ Sumangala refers to the flow of material resources from the 
state to the town; and by ‘spiritual development’, he refers to the importance of 
making sure such material change befits a specifically Sinhala-Buddhist model for Sri 
Lankan society - the principle producers and distributors of this Sinhala-Buddhist 
model for society, of course, are the Sangha and at a local level the temple itself. By 
‘political interference’, Sumangala refers to a situation in which local party politics 
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disrupts the flow of materials from the state to society causing disunity within the 
town. A good example of such ‘political interference’ can be found in the ‘Village 
Awakening’ (Gam Udawa) development scheme famously undertaken by the UNP in 
the late 1970s as documented by Brow (1996), which constructed a number of new 
houses largely in the North-Central Province. In so doing, electoral party politics 
created fissures and disunity in village life, making which political party one 
supported the central determinate of what material resources one could attain (ibid).  
 
Sumangala does not express his commitment to welfare as anything inherently 
‘political’. This he explained to me quite definitely: ‘I do not much concern myself in 
politics when working for the welfare of society’. Any interest the temple may have in 
the physical development of Dambulla is presented as an apolitical interest in the 
general ‘welfare’ of the people and moreover, to ensure that whatever developments 
occur correspond with the ideals of Sinhala-Buddhist (peasant) society (see Moore 
1989:190/191, 1985). Sumangala thus frames his religious responsibilities in terms of, 
‘spiritual development’ and ‘welfare’; in so doing he creates for himself room to 
maneuver when operating in the inescapably political sphere of national development, 
and the flow of material resources from the state to the town. By staking the claim to 
a ‘sacred area’ and evoking the language of religious responsibility for the 
development of the town, Sumangala has carved out an effective way to wade in the 
murky waters of ‘the political’.  
 
Goodhand, Klem, and Korf (2009) illustrate similar strategies utilised by religious 
actors and organisations operating in complex political environments in the east of Sri 
Lanka.19 Religious figures in the east, according to Goodhand et al, employ particular 
discursive strategies such as ‘neutrality and non-partisanship’ to appear apolitical 
(Goodhand et al 2009:693). Parallel examples of religious figures maneuvering 
around politically enforced boundaries - to undertake humanitarian work - in the north 
of Sri Lanka have also been documented by Johnson (2012). According to Johnson, 
Catholic Priests drew on ‘aesthetic’ and ‘moral’ capital to facilitate their passage 
across political borders (ibid 2012:84). Consistent within the detailed examples 
presented by Goodhand et al (2009) and Johnson (2012) is the necessity to avoid ‘the 
political’ in what they do, couching their work instead in terms of ‘neutrality’ and 
‘non-partisanship’, and drawing on the moral aesthetics of their position within 
religious institutions. Implicit within this modus operandi is the notion of a boundary 
– although improbable, porous, imagined, or ‘relational’ - between ‘politics’ and 
‘religion’. Here we have distinctly religious figures navigating their way through 
distinctly political arenas.  
 
In the preservation of a ‘sacred area’, the boundaries between religion and politics are 
on the one hand implied: Sumangala claims that what he is doing is not political, thus 
‘politics’ we assume must lie elsewhere. On the other hand, distinction between 
politics and religion is collapsed, as the preservation of a Buddhist sacred site is a 
project that maps neatly on to the Sinhalese-nationalist political vision for the country. 
Sumangala is not the first Buddhist monk to center himself in a political situation and 
claim to speak from a place outside the dirty world of politics. This process, as 
identified by a number of authors (Seneviratne 1999; Abeysekera 2002; Deegalle 
2004; Spencer 2012), has been evident since the 1940s and has transformed from 
young monks accompanying political rallies in the early 1980s to the entrance of 
monks into Parliament in 2004 representing the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), an 
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ultra-nationalist party formed in the wake of the death of a prominent monk in 2003 
(see, Deegalle 2004). The Muslim and Catholic organisations that navigate their 
activities through political arenas in the north and east do not possess the same 
powerful vocabulary of ‘religious responsibility’ that resonates within the Sinhalese-
Buddhist political imaginary. Whilst Christian and Muslim institutions lack the 
capacity to transgress the boundaries of ‘the political’ in Sri Lanka (Goodhand et al 
2009, Johnson 2012, Spencer 2012), an influential monk such as Sumangala can 
harness the moral authority of the Sangha to engage the world of mass politics in Sri 
Lanka: transposing religious responsibilities on to political projects.    
 
Sumangala and recognising politics  
 
The Dambulla mosque protest was not the first time Sumangala has been at the centre 
of a social and political drama in which he has transposed a relatively localised set of 
issues on to the national stage.20 In 1992, he conducted a protest against the 
construction of a five-star hotel in a near by village. The hotel protest garnered 
national media attention and rallied together politicians of various parties, as well as 
religious leaders of various faiths, against the government of the day. In the hotel 
protest Sumangala was (again) central to a highly politicized public event yet 
presented his involvement as removed entirely from the realm of politics. However, 
for such a reputedly ‘political monk’, Sumangala had been curiously absent from all 
of the seemingly political events that had hitherto unfolded in my field site: protests, 
elections, and protesting election results. These were dominated for the most part by 
merchants, local government authorities, and political party candidates. Before the 
mosque protest, Sumangala had not been visibly involved in politics throughout my 
time in Dambulla. This, of course, depends on how one defines and recognizes 
‘politics’. 
  
The conventional notion of electoral politics - campaigns to run for a government 
office, political parties, fireworks, flags and impassioned speeches - holds a 
prominent place in Sri Lankan social life, and the public performance of doing 
politics is often recognisable. The way the local mayor gives a speech about his 
contribution to the town at the opening of a village ceremony, the way he dresses, the 
way he is deferentially addressed by the villagers themselves, and the way a popular 
electoral candidate enters the town to an explosion of firecrackers; these are all 
recognised performances of ‘doing politics’. On the other hand there are instances 
where ‘political’ performance is not so straight forward to recognise and locate, for 
example, when men dance around in their underpants, hang off sign boards and 
impersonate demons (Spencer, 1990).      
 
Never-the-less, politics in Dambulla has a culturally recognizable and replicable 
public character. Politics is associated with Government - the bureaucratic offices of 
the state competition for the resources such offices can extol, and competition for the 
public office itself - and simultaneously associated with a particular way of behaving. 
How recognisable this way of behaving is, became apparent in the school hall of the 
Dambulla National College whilst watching a production of Ravindra Ariyarathna’s 
famous Sinhala play Balloth Ekka Baa  (‘Can’t Go With Dogs’) performed by the 
Dambulla Town Welfare Society, when the audience fell apart in raucous laughter at 
the impersonations of politicians and their entourages. At another level, politics can 
be seen in terms of politicking: leveraging influence through networks, connections, 
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favours, and patronage. There is an important interplay between the public 
performances of politics as it is conventionally understood - harnessing the various 
resources of the state - and the networks of influence and leverage that get things done 
at a local level - the micro-politics of everyday life. Throughout my fieldwork in 
Dambulla, the interplay between politics and politicking came to the surface in the 
context of a spectacle such as a protest. Such an event enables the public performance 
of authority and displaying ones political influence, at the same time, constructing the 
public event itself and gathering crowds requires pulling local alliances into order.   
 
Political influence can be seen to work here on two registers: i) influence in the 
official world of government politics; and ii) everyday politics, which is the ability to 
influence people in Dambulla. Sumangala has demonstrated the former through run-
ins with various Cabinet Ministers and Presidents over the years; this is political 
influence with a capital ‘P’. The most well known, and well documented, example of 
Sumangala’s influence penetrating the highest levels of government was the 
aforementioned hotel protest of the early 1990s which even defied President 
Premadasa for a short period of time (Seneviratne 1999). There is a general 
impression among Dambulla residents that Sumangala has access to the highest 
reaches of government, and furthermore that he is a figure around whom politicians 
and aspiring politicians must maneuver carefully.  
 
Whilst defying a President on the national stage could be recognized as the high 
profile end of Sumangala’s political influence, the less high profile work of politics 
concerns the consolidation and affirmation of power at the local level. This refers to 
Sumangala’s ability to hold sway and influence in peoples everyday lives. This is 
politics with a lower case ‘p’. The micro-politics of everyday life, as I found it to be 
in Dambulla throughout my fieldwork, is about having the authority or a good 
connection to an authority that can allow or deny something to happen. This version 
of everyday-politics arranges a school transfer, accesses a reputable doctor, or gets a 
family member a job. Everyday-politics relies on maintaining a network of 
connections and associates who can offer support. Political influence in Dambulla, 
with a lower case ‘p’, boils down to the ability to get something done. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly then, Dambulla is awash with organisations and associations that 
extend the networks and the influence of their individual members. 
 
The importance of associations and societies in local level politicking has not been 
overlooked by Sumangala who is the founder of the monks union (Sangha Sabhā) 
comprised of 170 monks from various temples in and around Dambulla which 
managed to break away from the dominant Kandy based Asgiriya chapter in the early 
1990s and formed a new sub sect of the Siyam Nikāya called the, Rangiri Dambulu 
Sangha Sabhāva (The Sangha Assembly of the Golden Rock of Dambulla) (see 
Abeysekera 2002 & Seneviratne 1999). He is also the primary ‘sponsor’ (anushāsaka) 
of almost all of the various unions, societies and associations in Dambulla known as 
samitiya. Such samitiya span farmer’s societies (govi samitiya), trader’s unions such 
as the ‘Golden Dambulla Sinhala Traders Foundation’ (Rangiri Dambulla Sinhala 
Velenda Padathma), ‘Town Traders Association’ (Nagarika Velenda Sangamiya), 
‘Our Dambulla’ (Apē Dambulla), the ‘Dambulla Town Welfare Society (Dambulla 
Nagarika Subhasādhika Samitiya), the town’s three wheeler union, and various other 
small community welfare societies.  
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One of the only traders’ unions with which Sumangala does not have leverage, and 
coincidently the most powerful union in Dambulla, is the Dambulla Dedicated 
Economic Centre Traders’ Union (Dambulla Vishashita Artka Madyastaani Velenda 
Sangamiya), which operates under the control of the local minister. This union 
includes members of the Mosque Committee. This was formed in 1997 when the 
Dambulla Dedicated Economic Centre (henceforth DDEC) was constructed under the 
auspices of the minister. Before the DDEC, the Dambulla vegetable merchants, 
known as mudalalis, controlled the sale of vegetables through commission stalls 
operating from the junction in the town centre. The mudalalis managed the process of 
exchange through lines of credit to farmers to grow the produce, and advances to 
buyers who came and took the vegetables away to sell on elsewhere. When the 
minister moved the traders into the DDEC, the DDEC traders’ union became the 
biggest single union in Dambulla and caused two other unions to fall apart due to lack 
of members. Sumangala himself sponsored one of these failed unions.  
 
License to trade in the DDEC, and thus entry to the influential DDEC traders’ union, 
is authorised by the local minister. The local minister, whose father was the minister 
before him, and whose son is set to be the minister after him, has for a long time been 
at loggerheads with Sumangala. By controlling the licenses required by the vendors in 
the market, the minister could issue out stalls to his supporters, who must in turn offer 
their support to the minister when required.21 In this way, the minister harnessed the 
commercial activities in the town and built a fairly robust system of patronage among 
the towns merchants.  Furthermore, the way in which the vegetable traders control the 
exchange of agricultural produce through the DDEC, has resulted in a situation 
whereby the farmers have become increasingly dependent on relations of patronage 
with the Dambulla vegetable merchants. 
 
Through the formation of the DDEC the local minister has harnessed the power of the 
wealthy merchants in the town. Not only do the relations of exchange in the DDEC 
make farmers increasingly dependent on merchants for the sale of their vegetables, 
the Dambulla merchants have also become an increasingly important point of contact 
for local level politicking as well as a line of access to politicians themselves. The 
increasing dependence on merchants in everyday politicking not only poses a threat to 
Sumangala’s channels of patronage in Dambulla, but places them instead in the 
sphere of influence of the local minister, with whom he has been in a longstanding 
confrontation.  
 
Five months prior to the Dambulla mosque protest the vegetable traders had organised 
a protest of their own which resulted in fights with the police, closing down roads, 
and the accidental tear-gassing of a hospital. In this instance, as with the mosque, the 
army was called upon to intervene. Although this event didn’t garner as much public 
comment as the mosque attack, it was a much larger and much more violent affair and 
put Dambulla squarely in the media spotlight. Furthermore, as a public spectacle, it 
emphasised and enforced allegiances and hierarchies at a local level, in much the 
same way Sumangala’s protest against the mosque would. Following the impressive 
(and ultimately successful) protest led by the merchants, Sumangala’s public 
performance of authority at the mosque could be seen as a strategic maneuver to 
reaffirm his position in the local power structure at a time when he is estranged from 
the local minister and the Dambulla merchants are becoming increasingly influential 
figures in local politicking. At another level, the attack on the mosque could be seen 
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as the exploitation of a ‘political opportunity’ (see, Bedi 2013:45; Meyer & 
Staggenborg 1996) by creating such a spectacle, Sumangala prompted the government 
to prove they were either as dedicated to post-war cohabitation as they had publicly 
professed to be, or, that they were committed to the nationalist rhetoric of Sinhala-
Buddhist primacy they also promulgate and on which their political support base 
rests.     
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is tempting to conclude with the suggestion that the attack on the Dambulla mosque 
was born out of a relatively localised set of disputes between the minister and the 
chief priest of the Dambulla temple, and thus had very little to do with Muslims, 
mosques and ‘sacred areas’. Whilst this is certainly one view from Dambulla that 
offers a partial explanation as to why the mosque was attacked, it does not fully 
acknowledge the visceral and antagonistic nature of identity politics in Sri Lanka. 
Whilst there may well be local and national-level politicking at play, there was 
simultaneously a very real sense of antipathy towards Muslims noticeable on the day 
of the protest.22 However, this paper has not sought to explore the causes of the event 
itself. Rather than ask, what made the attack on the mosque possible, this paper has 
explored what the attack on the Dambulla mosque makes possible? What is 
significant about the way in which the protest was carried out and the way it was 
framed by those at the centre of it? And what does such a protest tell us about politics 
and religion in Sri Lanka in 2012? To address these questions, rather than look at the 
causes of a local protest, a large part of the paper was dedicated to a description of the 
day itself. In doing so, the paper has shown how the performance of purification and 
the conservation of what is deemed to be ‘sacred’ in Sri Lanka, provides an effective 
idiom through which religious figures such as Sumangala can intelligibly articulate 
political claims whilst maintaining critical distance from the dirty world of ‘Politics’. 
It has additionally sought to contextualise the various different meanings of politics in 
Dambulla: highlighting the interplay of everyday politicking, high profile political 
performance, and in particular, the importance of denying to be doing anything 
‘political’ at all.   
 
In conclusion, I wish to return briefly to the confrontation that played out next to the 
kovil in Pādeniya. The quarrel between the protestor and the Sinhalese Pādeniya 
resident revealed the politics of ethno-religious separation central to Sumangala’s 
project of demarcating a ‘sacred’ area. But more importantly perhaps, the quarrel 
illustrates how the messy reality of life, notably the ways in which the residents of 
Pādeniya are inextricably entwined in Dambulla’s social fabric, undermines such 
projects of separation and purification along ethnic and religious lines. The task of 
purifying space, as pointed out by Goodhand et al (2009) and elsewhere by Hasbullah 
and Korf (2009), requires enforcing improbable boundaries and creating an - 
evidently – impossible order.  Rhetoric of ‘national purity’ appeared in Sri Lankan 
public life in the early 1930s with the emergence of mass electoral politics and the 
‘impossible work of purification’(Spencer 2003) - organising the modern nation state 
into an ethnically, religiously and culturally homogenous entity - has been undertaken 
by elite politicians throughout the twentieth century.  
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Central to Sumangala’s protest is the public performance of political rhetoric about 
national purity. The degree to which Sumangala genuinely believes in the 
inflammatory anti-muslim speeches he makes or the degree to which purifying sacred 
ground is important to him is unknown; there may well be an elective affinity at work 
between the two. However, what Sumangala recognizes better than many, is the 
effectiveness of publicly performing such beliefs against the potent political backdrop 
of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. ‘Purity’, may in reality be a near impossible order, 
but a certain public gesture to achieve it, such as Sumangala’s protest, produces an 
effect that demands a response from the world of politics. By framing his activities in 
terms of protecting a ‘sacred area’, concerning himself only with the ‘spiritual 
development’ of the town as part of his ‘religious responsibility’, Sumangala appears 
to transcend/transgress the disunity associated with party politics, to speak from 
beyond ‘the political’, yet remain simultaneously engaged in both national-level 
politics and local-level politicking. What I have also suggested here is that although 
Sumangala invokes ethno-nationalist registers, which have much currency on the 
national stage, he does so in part for the ‘small-p politics’ of the local.  
 
 
Notes 
 
                                                          
1 The Bodu Bala Senā (Buddhist Strength Force), appear to have come forward as the primary 
instigator of the recently organised demonstrations against Muslims.However, the protest against Halal 
food in Kuliyapitiya at the end of January was claimed to be organised by a right wing Sinhala 
Buddhist group calling themselves and Hela Sihala Hiru (Party of the Sinhala Sun). On the day of the 
protest against the Dambulla mosque a group called Sinhala Ravaya (Roar of the Sinhalese) were 
present and said to have caused much of the aggravation. 
2 Premakumara De Silva has produced a short but useful overview of some of the transformations that 
have taken place in the anthropology of ‘Sinhala Buddhism’ (see De Silva 2006). 
3 The Golden Temple handles the administration of the Dambulla Cave Temple. For simplicity I will 
refer to the Dambulla Temple throughout to encompass both, as both are under the charge of 
Sumangala. 
4 The ‘Rangiri Sri Lanka Media Network’, although situated in the compound with the Cave Temple 
and the Golden Temple is a separate enterprise run by the ‘Rangiri Dambulla Development 
Foundation, registered under the Government Company’s Act, also owned by Sumangala. 
5 Sumangala also told the crowd that Muslims are ‘an inhumane/animal-like race of people who can cut 
the neck of a living cow’ (Harakgay bella amu-amuweng cappanna pouluwan thirisangjathiyak may). 
6The attack on the Dambulla mosque occurred, ten days before the 2012 May Day rally, which had, 
rather unfortunately given the circumstances, been organised around the theme of coexistence, and 
named, ‘Rata Ekata - One Country’. 
7 This is the history of the mosque in Dambulla as told to me by a member of the trustee board of the 
Dambulla Mosque Committee. A Muslim trader in the Dambulla vegetable market apparently holds the 
title deed to the land. 
8The Divisional Secretary turned up basically just to say that she had no idea that this was happening 
and is just now learning about the event. 
9 ‘Topi mehing palayang’. Topi’ is a very impolite version of you, ‘mehing palayang’ translates as, get 
out of here. Both ‘mehing palayang’ and its opposite, ‘wara meharta’ – get here, are aggressive terms 
of address. ‘mehing palayang’ and ‘wara meharta’ are also occasionally used in the home by the 
mother referring to her son, usually when he is in trouble. They are commands and used only on a 
person who is considered to be of 'lower' status (class, age, gender) than oneself even if it is said in 
affection, or in a context where there is affection – like the mother to the son. The word that makes 
Sumangala’s address to the woman in Pādeniya particularly aggressive is the second person pronoun 
‘topi’. 
10 Women in particular have been subject to subtle and obvious forms of harassment and control 
throughout the ethno-nationalist project in Sri Lanka. Much of this has been superbly documented by 
scholars such as Jayawardena (1992), De Mel (2001), de Alwis (1996, 2004), Hewamanne (2008), 
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Lynch (2007), Ruwanpura K (2008), and Ruwanpura E (2011). In much of this work female morality 
presents a site to be regulated. Women displaced in the conflict, or engaged in daily wage labour and 
labour migration - such as the women in Pādeniya – are associated with impurity and present a moral 
peril in the Sinhala-Buddhist national imaginary. For more on this see in particular Jayawardena (1992) 
and de Alwis (2004). 
11 This particular ritual has seen a recent resurgence in the North of Sri Lanka, see Derges (2009, 
2012). 
12 Perahera is a term for a ritual procession, which is usually associated with Buddhism. It normally 
involves a pageant of elephants, fire dancers, and Kandyan dancers parading through the streets. 
13 Sādu is another word for a Monk, but ‘Sādu-Sādu-Sādu’, as was repeatedly shouted out on the day of 
the protest is a chant of worship to what is referred to as the ‘triple gem’: the Lord Buddha, the 
Dhamma (Buddha’s teachings), and the Sangha (the Monastic community). 
14 http://www.sundaytimes.lk/120429/News/nws_35.html Accessed on February 16th, 2013 
15 The Ministry of Urban Development is under the Ministry of Defence, which is headed by the 
President’s brother.  
16 People closed their shops to protest the closure of the mosque in Kalmunai, Samanthurai, 
Akkaraipattu, and Saindamaradu areas in the Ampara district. This happened on the 26th of April. Also 
on this day the Katankady Mosque federation was set on fire. 
17 http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/mosque-set-on-fire-in-kattankudy/ Accessed on  
February 16th, 2013 
18 This process has been well documented in Elizabeth Nissan’s doctoral thesis, ‘History in the 
Making: Anurādhapura and the Sinhala Buddhist Nation’ (1989). 
19 The most salient example is the Maruthamunai Mosque Federation’s involvement in humanitarian 
aid distribution and conflict resolution. 
20 For the most detailed analysis of this protest see, H.L Seneviratne (1999) Chp. 5. Also see A. 
Abeysekara (2002), Uyangoda (1992) (Uyangoda’s article is published in Sinhala and English. The 
article used by Senivaratne in his analysis of the Kandalama debates was published in Sinhala in 
Pravada 2. (July-August) 7-9). 
21 There were more stalls in the newly constructed DDEC than had previously been operating at the 
roadside, so for the most part those who were trading at the junction automatically got a stall in the 
DDEC and it was the additional stalls that were given to party supporters.  
22 It has not been the aim of the paper to unpack the antipathy felt towards Muslims in Sri Lanka, 
indeed my own ethnographic data from Dambulla would not enable such a discussion. I would instead 
direct the reader to the valuable scholarly work of Farzana Haniffa.  
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